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Abstract
Kamp’s theorem states that there is a temporal logic with two modalities (“until” and “since”) which is expres-
sively complete for the first-order monadic logic of order over the real line. In this paper we show that there is no
temporal logic with finitely many modalities which is expressively complete for the future fragment of first-order
monadic logic of order over the real line (a future formula over the real time line is a formula whose truth value at
a point is independent of what happened in the past).
© 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Predicate Logic has been accepted among logicians as the appropriate language for specification and
verification in mathematics and elsewhere. It allows for a uniform treatment of a host of languages
whose expressive power varies according to the use of different kinds of variables (individual variables,
set variables etc.) and of different constant names (for objects, functions or relations). In particular the
appropriate language to deal with the evolving of reactive systems (or any other system) in time is the
monadic logic of order (MLO): Its formulas are built using atomic propositions t ∈ X, atomic relations
between elements t1 = t2, t1 < t2, Boolean connectives, first-order quantifiers ∃t and ∀t . The relation
< is the natural order of time and the predicates X stand for each of the properties which may hold or
not at any moment in time, and are of interest to us. This language is in fact the first-order monadic
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logic of order (FOMLO). For more expressive power we could use second-order MLO which has also
second-order (set) quantifiers ∃X and ∀X.
Outside of the mathematical community the introduction of variables and their interaction with the
quantifiers was not unanimously embraced and attempts have been made to define formal languages
which retain some of the flavor of natural speech. Notably among these languages are the temporal
logics which avoid the individual variables and the quantification over these variables. This is done by
(a) taking the order of time as a primitive relation that needs not be mentioned explicitly, (b) by restricting
the properties defined by formulas to properties of single points (and not to relations among points),1 (c)
by taking as atoms Atomic Propositions, and most important: (d) by the use of Modalities (called also
Temporal Connectives) to combine formulas into more complex ones. A k-place modality C transforms
statements ϕ1, . . . , ϕk on points possibly other than the given point t0 to a statement C(ϕ1, . . . , ϕk) on
the point t0. The rule that specifies when the statement C(ϕ1, . . . , ϕk) is true for the given point, is
called the Truth Table of C. The choice of the particular modalities with their truth tables determines the
different temporal logics. A temporal logic with modalities C1, . . . , Ck is denoted by TL(C1, . . . , Ck).
Of course there is not much interest in a modality C whose truth table is arbitrary and is defined ad
hoc in each and every structure where the logic is to be interpreted. To be of interest a truth table needs to
have a uniform description in some metalanguage, that connects the set of points where C(ϕ1, . . . , ϕk)
holds to the sets of points where each of the ϕi holds. In all practical cases this truth table is itself
a formula of some natural predicate logic and as a result all of the temporal logic embeds into the
predicate logic. In this respect it is legitimate to say that “temporal logic is but syntactical sugaring of
a fragment of predicate logic”. This syntactical sugaring is all gain and no loss if the temporal logic
is “expressively complete” for the predicate logic. I.e., if every formula (with single free variable) in
the predicate logic is equivalent to some temporal formula. It may also happen that a temporal logic is
expressively complete for a predicate logic with respect to one family of structures but not with respect
to a larger family.
The simplest modality is the one place modality FX saying “X will hold some time in the future”. Its
truth table is usually formalized by the FOMLO formula ϕF(t0, X) ≡ (∃t > t0) t ∈ X. Two more natural
modalities are the modalities U (“Until”) and S (“Since”). XUY means that X will hold from now until
a time in the future when Y will hold. XSY means that Y was true at some point of time in the past
and since that point X was true until (not necessarily including) now. TL(U,S) is an important temporal
logic and often it is referred to as “the temporal logic”. Both modalities have truth tables in FOMLO (see
Example 1) and hence every temporal logic formula translates naturally into a formula of FOMLO.
The main models for time are 〈N, <〉, the natural numbers as a model of discrete time and 〈R+, <〉,
the non-negative real line as the model for continuous time. These two models are called the canonical
models of time. A major result concerning temporal logic is Kamp’s theorem [5,9] which says that
TL(U,S), the temporal logic having “Until” and “Since” as only modalities, is expressively complete for
FOMLO over the two canonical models.
This sets the scene for Amir Pnueli’s influential declaration in [10] that temporal logic (TL) was the
most suitable framework for the specification of properties of systems. TL became very popular in the
Computer Science community and it enjoyed extensive research during the last 20 years to the exclusion
of almost any other formalism, in particular that of FOMLO. Since TL(U,S) is expressively complete it
may seem that concentrating on TL(U,S) was harmless.
1 This restriction is not essential.
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In fact we believe that much understanding, insight and technical tools were sacrificed when the
robust and uniform classical logic was abandoned as the frame of reference. We addressed this point
quite strongly in [8]. In this paper we answer a question that is almost as relevant to computer science as
Kamp’s theorem and yet it was ignored: What are the proper modalities to use for a temporal logic that
deals only with future formulas.
A future formula is a formula whose truth value at a point depends only on the point and its future
and not on what happened or not in the past. For example the formula X Until Y says that X will hold
from now until (at least) a point in the future when Y will hold. The truth value of this formula at a point
t0 does not depend on the question whether X(t) or Y (t) are true for points t such that t < t0. Note that
the definition of a future formula is a semantical definition but the problem whether a given formula is a
future formula or not is decidable (see Remark 2.1).
Most of the temporal formalisms studied in computer science concern only future formulas. Is there
also a natural future temporal logic that is expressively complete for the class of future FOMLO formulas
with respect to the canonical models? Is it simply TL(U) and if not can we add some naturally defined
modalities to obtain an expressively complete future logic?
This important question was not answered before. In fact it was not even asked. Instead even the most
advanced research in temporal logic treated the subject as if there was no problem and as if TL(U) is the
natural future fragment of TL(U,S) (compare for example [1] and [7]).
There is indeed no problem in the discrete case: Over the discrete model 〈N, <〉 Kamp’s theorem
holds also for future formulas of FOMLO and the future fragment of FOMLO has the same expressive
power as TL(U) [5,6].
The situation is radically different for the continuous time model 〈R, <〉: In this paper we show that
TL(U) is not expressively complete and there is no easy way to remedy it. In fact we show:
Theorem. No future temporal logic with finite base is expressively complete; there is no temporal logic
with a finite set of modalities which is expressively equivalent to the future fragment of FOMLO over the
reals.
Almost the same proof shows there is no temporal logic with a finite set of modalities which is
expressively equivalent to the future fragment of FOMLO over the rationals.
Related work. Similar methods produced negative results for other logics and models (see survey [12]).
It was shown in [13] that there is no temporal logic with finite base that is expressively complete for
CTL∗ [4] with respect to the class of (partially ordered) trees. In another direction it was shown in [2]
that there is no temporal logic with finite base which is expressively complete for second-order monadic
logic of order, even with respect to the discrete model 〈N, <〉.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the definitions of the monadic
logic, the temporal logics and Kamp’s theorem. In Section 3 we prove that over the class of ordinals
there is no finite basis for a temporal logic which is expressively complete for future formulas. To this
end we show that for every pair of distinct natural numbers k and n there is a future formula that distincts
between the ordered sets ωk and ωn for k /= n. On the other hand we use a theorem by Ehrenfeucht [3] to
prove that this distinction cannot be made by a temporal logic whose modalities correspond to first-order
monadic logic formulas with bounded depth of quantifiers. Thus in particular not by a logic with finitely
many modalities. In Section 4 we embed the ordinals in the real line and deduce the main theorem for
Y. Hirshfeld, A. Rabinovich / Information and Computation 187 (2003) 196–208 199
the real line. Finally, in Section 5 we discuss extensions of the theorem and compare it with the results
on future logic in [5].
2. Preliminaries
2.1. First-order monadic logic of order
The syntax of the first-order monadic predicate logic of order – FOMLO has in its vocabulary individ-
ual (first-order) variables t0, t1, . . . , monadic predicate variables X0, X1, . . . , and one binary relation
< (the order). We use lower case letters t, x, y to range over individual variables and upper case letters
X, Y,Z to range over monadic variables. Atomic formulas are of the form X(t), t1 < t2 and t1 = t2.
Well formed formulas of the first-order monadic logic FOMLO are obtained from atomic formulas using
Boolean connectives ¬,∨,∧,→ and the (first-order) quantifiers ∃t and ∀t .
The quantification depth is defined as usual: (1) if ϕ is atomic then its quantification depth, qd(ϕ) is 0;
(2) qd(¬(ϕ)) = qd(ϕ); (3) qd(ϕ ∨ ψ) = max{qd(ϕ), qd(ψ)}; (4) qd(∀xϕ) = qd(∃xϕ) = qd(ϕ) + 1.
A structure for FOMLO is a tuple M = 〈A,<,P1, . . . ,Pn〉 where < is a linear order over A and
P1, . . . ,Pn are monadic predicates. Such a structure is also called a colored chain, or for brevity simply
a chain.
The important examples for us are 〈R+, <〉 and 〈N, <〉; the non-negative real line and the non-nega-
tive integers.
We shall not repeat the inductive definition saying when is a formula satisfied. We recall the notation:
M, τ1, . . . τk;P1, . . . ,Pm |= ϕ(t1, . . . , tk;X1, . . . , Xm)
which we also abbreviate to M |= ϕ[τ1, . . . , τk;P1, . . . ,Pm] or even to M |= ϕ[τ ,P] where M is a
structure, τ1, . . . , τk are elements of M , P1, . . . ,Pm are unary predicates (i.e sets) in M , ϕ is a formula
and t1, . . . , tk;X1, . . . , Xm include all the variables of ϕ.
Let A = 〈A, <〉 be a structure. We shall use Aa to denote the substructure of A over the set
Aa = {b ∈ A|b  a}.
Definition 1 (Future FOMLO formula). A formula ϕ(x0, X1, X2, . . . , Xm) of FOMLO with one free
first-order variable x0 is a future formula if for every chain A = (A,<) and a ∈ A and every m subsets
S1, S2, . . . , Sm of A, the following holds:
(A, a, S1, S2, . . . , Sm) |= ϕ(x0, X1, X2, . . . , Xm)
if and only if
(Aa, a, S′1, S′2, . . . , S′m) |= ϕ(x0, X1, X2, . . . , Xm)
where S′i = {b ∈ Si |b  a} for i = 1, 2, . . . , m.
Remark 2.1. Observe that the notion of a future formula is a semantic notion, not a syntactic one.
However, it is possible to give a syntactic condition characterizing the future formulas: with the for-
mula φ(x0, X1, . . . , Xk), we associate “the future version” φ′ of φ, obtained by replacing all first-order
quantifiers “∀x” or “∃x” in φ with relativized versions “(∀x)x0” and “(∃x)x0” which are shorthand for
“∀x x  x0 → · · ·” and “∃x x  x0 ∧ · · ·”.
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Then for any φ, the relativized φ′ is a future formula. Moreover,
A, s, S1, . . . , Sk |= φ iff As, s, S′1, . . . , S′k |= φ′,
where, for i = 1, . . . , k, S′i is the restriction of Si to | As |. Hence, φ is a future formula iff φ and φ′
are equivalent i.e., iff φ ↔ φ′ is valid. This implies that being a future formula is decidable since the
validity of FOMLO formulae is decidable [11].
2.2. Temporal logics and modalities
In this section, we review basic definitions and results about temporal logics and modalities. We also
introduce {T L}∞k=1, an infinite sequence of temporal logics; these logics provide natural yardsticks by
which to measure the expressive power of temporal logics.
The syntax of temporal logic (TL) has in its vocabulary a set of variables (sometimes called propo-
sitional names) and a set B of modality names (sometimes called “temporal connectives” or “temporal
operators”) with prescribed arity B = {#l11 , #l22 , . . .} (we usually omit the arity notation). The set of mo-
dality names B might be infinite. A temporal logic based on a set of modalities B is denoted TL(B); B is
called the basis of TL(B). Atomic temporal formulas are just variables and other formulas are obtained
from the atoms using Boolean connectives and applying the modalities. The syntax of TL(B) is given
by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= True | False | P | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ¬ϕ1 | #lii (ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕli ),
where P ranges over the variable names.
Temporal formulas are interpreted over linearly (or partially) ordered sets with monadic predicates.
Every modality #l is interpreted in every chain T = (A,<) as an operator #lT : [P(A)]l → P(A) which
assigns “the set of points where #l(Q1, . . . ,Qk) holds” to the l-tuple 〈Q1, . . . ,Ql〉 (Here P is the power
set notation, and P(A) denotes the set of all subsets of A.) Formally, let T = (A,<, P T1 , P T2 , . . .) be
a chain with monadic predicates PT1 , P
T
2 , . . . over A. The semantics of a formula ϕ ∈ T L over T is
defined inductively as follows. For atomic formulas T , s |= Pi iff s ∈ PTi ; the semantics of Boolean
combinations is defined as usual, and the semantics of modalities is defined by:
T , s |= #l(ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕl) iff s ∈ #lT (Rϕ1, Rϕ2, . . . , Rϕl )
where Rϕi = {a | T , a |= ϕi} for all i, 1  i  l.
2.2.1. Truth tables
In this paper, we consider only temporal modalities which are defined in (first order) MLO: we assume
that for every l place modality # there is a formula (truth table) #¯(x0, X1, X2, . . . , Xl) of FOMLO with
one free first-order variable x0 and l set variables, such that for every chain T = 〈A,<〉 and subsets
Ri ⊆ A:
#T (R1, R2, . . . , Rl) = {s | (T , s, R1, R2, . . . , Rl) |= #¯(x0, X1, X2, . . . , Xl)}.
Let M be a temporal modality defined by a truth table φM ∈ FOMLO. We say that M has quantifier-
depth k if qd(φM) = k.
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Example 1 (Some common modalities and their truth tables).
• The one place modality F (“eventually”); its truth table is φF(x0, X1) = ∃y(y > x0 ∧ y ∈ X1).
• The one place modality G (“globally”); its truth table is φG(x0, X1) = ∀y((y > x0) → (y ∈ X1)).• The two place modality U (“until”); its truth table is:
φU(x0, X1, X2)
= ∃y(y > x0 ∧ y ∈ X1 ∧ ∀z(x0 < z < y) → z ∈ X2).
In the literature, sometimes a “non-strict” definition of Until is given: the “non-strict until” Uns mo-
dality has truth table:
φUns (x0, X1, X2)
= ∃y(y  x0 ∧ y ∈ X1 ∧ ∀z(x0  z < y) → z ∈ X2).
Clearly, Uns can be defined using U.
• The two place modality S (“since”); its truth table is:
φS(x0, X1, X2)
= ∃y(y < x0 ∧ y ∈ X1 ∧ ∀z(x0 > z > y) → z ∈ X2).
The choice of the particular modalities with their truth tables determines the different temporal logics.
Definition 2 (Future modality).
• A temporal modality is a first-order future modality if its truth table is a future formula of FOMLO.
• A temporal logic is a future temporal logic if all its modalities are future modalities.
In the example above all modalities except S are first-order future modalities.
2.2.2. The logics TLk
We define a hierarchy of future temporal logics. For each k the temporal logic TLk has infinitely many
modalities but each of them has a truth table that has quantifier depth at most k. Formally, we have:
Definition 3 (Logics TLk). For every k  1, let TLk be the temporal logic with the set of basic modalities
defined by the following set Mk of truth tables:
Mk = {ϕ : qd(ϕ(x0, X1, . . . , Xl))  k and ϕ is a first-order future formula}.
The basic modalities of TLk have a truth table of quantifier depth k, but formulas of TLk permit
arbitrarily deep nesting of modalities. Properties of “an arbitrary quantifier depth” can be expressed
even in TL1. More precisely, for every k, there is a TL1 formula φk which is equivalent to no FOMLO
formula of quantifier-depth k [13]. To see this observe that the modality F of Example 1 has quantifier
depth one. We define ϕn to be the formula of TL(F) claiming that in the future there will be at least
n points where P holds. Formally ϕ1 = FP and ϕn+1 = F(P ∧ ϕn) then it is known that any formula
equivalent to ϕn must have at least quantifier depth log(n). Hence, the formulas in the temporal logic
with this single modality F are not all equivalent to formulas in any fragment of FOMLO which has
bounded quantifier depth.
The main technical result of the paper is that the logics TLk form a proper hierarchy for linear con-
tinuous time. From this it will follow that no future temporal logic with finite base is expressively
complete.
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2.3. Kamp’s theorem
The different temporal logics are a convenient way to use fragments of FOMLO. To discuss the
strength of a given temporal logic, we use the following standard definition.
A temporal logic formula ϕ(X1, . . . , Xk) is equivalent to a FOMLO formula ψ(x0, X1, . . . , Xk) (or
to a temporal logic formula ψ) over a structure A = 〈A,<〉 iff for every a ∈ A and S1, . . . , Sk ⊆ A :
〈A,<〉, a |= ϕ(S1, . . . , Sk) if and only if (A,<), a |= ψ(a, S1, . . . , Sk).
ϕ is equivalent to ψ (over a set C of structures) iff for every A (respectively, for every A ∈ C), ϕ is
equivalent to ψ over A.
Definition 4. Let L be a fragment of FOMLO and let C be a set of structures. A temporal logic TL′ is
expressively complete for L over C if for every formula ψ(x0, X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ L with single free first-
order variable x0, there is a formula ϕ ∈ T L′ which is equivalent to ψ over C, and for every formula
ψ ∈ T L′, there is a formula ψ(x0, X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ L with single free first-order variable x0 which is
equivalent to ϕ over C.
A major result concerning TL and FOMLO is Kamp’s theorem. In this paper we are interested in
the expressive power of logics relative to the real line. There is a technical property which unifies in
the general case the treatment of real and discrete time: Recall that a chain is Dedekind complete iff
every non-empty bounded subset has a lowest upper bound. The natural numbers are trivially Dedekind
complete since every bounded set is finite and has a maximal element. The real line is also Dedekind
complete. Kamp’s result applies to both these models.
Theorem 2.2 (cf. [5, 9]). The temporal logic with two modalitiesU(q1, q2) (“q2 until q1”) and S(q1, q2)
(“q2 since q1”) is expressively complete for FOMLO over the class of Dedekind complete chains.
If we restrict our attention to future logic we obtain a dichotomy for which only one side of the coin
was observed before:
Theorem 2.3 (cf. [6]). The temporal logic with the single modality U(q1, q2) is expressively complete
for the future fragment of FOMLO over natural numbers.
Thus in the discrete case TL(U) is as strong as first-order future MLO. We will see that for continuous
time the situation is radically different.
3. No finite base over ordinals
The ordinal numbers may not be to the taste of every computer scientist, but we need them for the
proof that finite base future temporal logics are never expressively complete over real time. Not much
set theory is needed for our purpose; suffices it to say that every ordinal is a chain. We use the following
ordinals which we define directly:
• The ordinal ω is the set of natural numbers with its natural order.
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• The ordinal ω2 is an ω-sequence of blocks, each isomorphic to ω. We also declare each point to be
bigger than every point in a previous block.
• More generally, ωn+1 is an ω-sequence of blocks, each isomorphic to ωn. Each point is declared
larger than all points in previous blocks.
An alternative definition of the ordered set ωn is the set of n-tuples of natural numbers ordered lexico-
graphically. The element which corresponds to a tuple 〈mn−1, mn−2, . . . , m0〉 is denoted by ωn−1mn−1 +
ωn−2mn−2 + · · · + m0.
Easy induction proves the following useful feature of these ordinals:
Lemma 3.1. Every suffix of the ordinal ωk is isomorphic to ωk.
It follows immediately that:
Lemma 3.2 (Future indiscernibility). ωk is homogeneous for future formulas:
• Every future formula in the predicate logic of order, with one free first order variable (and no predicate
variables) hold at any point of ωk iff it holds at every point in ωk.
• In particular if ϕ(t) is a future formula with no predicate variables then
ωk, 0 |= ϕ(t) iff ωk |= ∀tϕ(t).
• Every future TL formula without predicate variables holds at one point of ωk iff it holds at every point
of ωk.
Note that a TL formula without free predicate variables is built out of the constant predicates T rue
and False, the modalities and the Boolean operators.
We introduce the notation ≡n to say that two models cannot be distinguished by a first-order sentence
of quantifier depth n. More precisely, let M and M ′ be two structures in the signature of FOMLO. We
write M ≡n M ′ if and only if for any sentence ϕ with qd(ϕ)  n we have M |= ϕ iff M ′ |= ϕ.
Theorem 3.3 (Ehrenfeucht theorem [3]). ωk ≡n ωm for k,m  n.
Lemma 3.4 (Main lemma). Let ϕ be a TLn formula with no predicate variables. if k,m > n + 1 then
ωk, 0 |= ϕ if and only if ωm, 0 |= ϕ.
Proof. The proof of this lemma combines the Ehrenfeucht’s theorem for general formulas with the facts
that were established for future formulas. The proof proceeds by structural induction.
For the atomic formulas True and False the claim is obvious.
For Boolean combinations the result follows immediately from the induction assumption.
It remains to deal with the case where ϕ = C(ϕ1, . . . , ϕl) where C is an l place modality with future
truth table of quantifier depth n. We assume without loss of generality that ωk, 0 |= ϕ.
By induction assumption for i = 1, . . . , l:
ωk, 0 |= ϕi iff ωm, 0 |= ϕi.
By Lemma 3.2 and by induction assumption for each i = 1, . . . , l the formula ϕi either holds for ev-
ery t in ωk and for every t in ωm or it holds for none of these points. Accordingly we shall denote
by Tϕi the formula True if ωk, 0 |= ϕi and the formula False otherwise. Since ωk, 0 |= ϕ it follows
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that ωk, 0 |= (t, Tϕ1, . . . , Tϕl ), where (t,X1, . . . , Xl) is the truth table of C(X1, . . . , Xl). Again by
Lemma 3.2, ωk |= (∀t)(t, Tϕ1, . . . , Tϕl ). By Ehrenfeucht theorem ωm |= ∀t(t, Tϕ1, . . . , Tϕl ), so that
ωm, 0 |= (t, Tϕ1, . . . , Tϕl ). It now follows that ωm, 0 |= ϕ. 
Next we note that:
Lemma 3.5. For every n there is a future formula φn(x0) such that ωn does not satisfy φn(0), but
ωk |= φn(0) for every k > n.
Proof. For every formula ψ(t0) in the language of order we denote by LIMψ(t0) the formula:
LIMψ(t0) = (∀t1 < t0)∃t ((t1 < t < t0) ∧ ψ(t))
Let now ψ0 be the formula t0 = t0 and for every n, ψn+1 = LIMψn . It is a main feature of the ordinals
chosen that for n > 0 no element in ωn satisfies ψn while unboundedly many elements in ωn+1 do satisfy
it. More precisely, in ωn only the (limit points) elements of the form ωn−1mn−1 + ωn−2mn−2 + · · · +
ωm1 + 0 satisfy ψ1; only the points of the form ωn−1mn−1 + ωn−2mn−2 + · · · + ω2m2 + ω0 + 0 sat-
isfy ψ2 and only the points of the form ωn−1mn−1 + ωn−2mn−2 + · · · + ωlml + ωl−10 + · · · + ω0 + 0
satisfy ψl .
Note that ψn is not a future formula but if we define φn to be (∃t > t0)ψn+1(t) then φn is a future
formula which holds in ωk at 0 iff n < k. 
Theorem 3.6. There is no finite base temporal logic which is expressively equivalent to the future
fragment of FOMLO over the class of ordinals.
Proof. Let TL(C1, . . . , Cs) be a temporal logic all whose formulas are equivalent to future predicate
formulas. We shall show that there are formulas of future predicate logic which are not equivalent to any
formula of TL(C1, . . . , Cs). For i = 1, . . . , s let Ci be a ji place modality. The formula Ci(X1, . . . , Xji )
is equivalent to a future predicate formula ϕi(t, X1, . . . , Xji ) which in turn may serve as a truth table
for the modality Ci . If we choose n0 to be large enough so that ϕ1, · · · , ϕs have quantifier depth less
than n0 then by Lemma 3.4 no formula of TL(C1, . . . , Cs) can tell apart ωk and ωn0 for n0 < k. On the
other hand by Lemma 3.5 there is a future predicate formula which does. Hence TL(C1, . . . , Cs) is not
expressively complete. 
4. No finite base over the reals
In this section, we prove:
Theorem 4.1. There is no temporal logic with a finite set of modalities which is expressively equivalent
to the future fragment of FOMLO over the reals.
We intend to use the results from the previous section and to that end we construct a systematic
embedding of the ordinals under discussion into the real line. For a fixed natural number k we denote by
Rk the following set:
Rk = ωk × [0, 1),
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where [0, 1) is a half open interval. We order Rk lexicographically:
〈α, a〉 < 〈α1, a1〉 iff α < α1 or (α = α1 and a < a1).
Relatively simple arguments from set theory show that:
1. There is an order isomorphism σk between Rk and R+, the non-negative real line.
2. We denote by Pk the image under σk of the set {〈α, 0〉|α ∈ ωk}. Then 0 ∈ Pk , Pk is unbounded in R+
and Pk is order isomorphic to ωk .
3. Every point t ∈ Pk has an immediate successor in Pk , i.e, a point t ′ which is in Pk and such that
no point between t and t ′ is in Pk . Moreover the open interval (t, t ′) is order isomorphic to the unit
interval (0, 1).
4. Any bounded increasing sequence of elements in Pk converges to an element of Pk .
Note that this construction amounts to a uniform order preserving embedding of each ωk as an un-
bounded subset of the real line.
Similarly to Lemma 3.2 this construction yields a model which is very homogeneous with respect to
future formulas:
Lemma 4.2. Let Mk = 〈R+, <, Pk〉 be a continuous time model with an embedding of the set ωk onto
the set Pk as described above.
• Any suffix of Mk that has a first point which is in Pk is isomorphic to Mk .
• Any two suffixes that have first points which are not in Pk are isomorphic to each other.
• Let ϕ(t, X) be a future formula of the first-order monadic language of order, such that X is its only
predicate variable. Then under the assignment of Pk to X in Mk the formula ϕ(t, X) is equivalent to
either True or False or X(t) or ¬X(t).
Proof. The first two facts are easy set theory and the third follows directly from the first two. 
To generalize the method of the previous section we need the generalization of Ehrenfeucht’s Theorem
3.3.
Lemma 4.3 (Generalized Ehrenfeucht theorem). 〈R+, <, Pk〉 ≡n 〈R+, <, Pn〉 for n < k.
Proof. The proof adapts Ehrenfeucht’s original proof for ordinals [3] to the new context and it will be
given in Appendix A. 
Our main theorem 4.1 follows immediately from Lemmas 4.5 and 4.4, exactly as Theorem 3.6 follows
from Lemmas 3.5 and 3.4.
Lemma 4.4. For every TLn formula ϕ(X) if k,m > n then
R, Pk, 0 |= ϕ if and only if R, Pm, 0 |= ϕ.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.4. The proof is again reduced to the case of a
formula C(ϕ1, . . . , ϕl), where C is a l-place modality with truth table(t, X1, . . . , Xl). By the induction
assumption and Lemma 4.2 each ϕi is equivalent to True, False, X or ¬X and when these are substituted
in the truth table they yield the same value in 〈R,Pk〉 and in 〈R,Pn〉 by Lemma 4.3. 
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Lemma 4.5. For every n there is a future formula ψn(x0, X) such that the chain of reals R does not
satisfy ψn(0, Pn), but R |= ψn(0, Pk) for every k > n.
Proof. We relativize the formula φn of Lemma 3.5 to the variable X; specifically, starting with innermost
quantified formulas we replace every formula ∃tψ by the formula ∃t (X(t) ∧ ψ), and every formula ∀tψ
by the formula ∀t (X(t) → ψ). Working our way outwards we relativize in this way all the quantifiers
to the predicate X. This technique is due to Tarski and can be found for example in [11]. It results in a
formula ψn which has the property [11] that
〈R, P 〉 |= ψn iff 〈P,<〉 |= φn.
Recall that 〈Pk,<〉 is isomorphic to 〈ωk,<〉. Lemma 3.5, the definition of ψn and the above equivalence
implies the conclusion of Lemma 4.5. 
5. Concluding remarks
1. We proved that over the real time line there is no temporal logic with only finitely many modalities
which describes only future formulas and is expressively complete for future first-order monadic
logic of order. A closer look at the proof of Theorem 4.1 shows that it applies almost word for word
to the rational line. The only changes are (1) replace reals by the rationals and (2) in the definition of
Rk replace the interval [0, 1) of reals by the interval [0, 1) of rationals. Hence we obtain
Theorem 5.1. There is no temporal logic with a finite set of modalities which is expressively
equivalent to the future fragment of FOMLO over the rationals.
Recall that a subset B of a chain is dense in itself if it contains at least two points and between any
two distinct points of B there is a point of B. A more careful version of the proof of Theorem 4.1
would yield the following:
Theorem 5.2. Let 〈A,<〉 be a totally ordered set which contains (not necessarily as a subinterval)
a subset B that is dense in itself. Then there is no finite expressively complete future temporal logic
over the model.
2. In computer science we often concentrate on behaviors that have finite variability rather than on all
possible behaviors in time; A predicate X has finite variability if there is an unbounded sequence
〈tn〉n∈N such that t0 = 0 and the truth value of X does not change on the open intervals (ti, ti+1).
If we restrict our interest to the subclass of models that have only predicates with finite variability
then it can be shown that the logic TL(U) with only the “Until” modality is expressively complete for
future formulas. We do not prove it here; it can be done directly along the line of Kamp’s proof, with
some sensitive adaptation, or we can combine Kamp’s result for the discrete case with decomposition
arguments. This is certainly not something that can be taken as self-evident.
3. Theorem 10.3.20 in [5] identifies a fragment of TL(U,S) which comprises future formulas and is
expressively complete for future first-order monadic logic of order. The description of this “future
temporal logic” is very simple and it looks like the best positive result that is consistent with our neg-
ative result. The authors define the one place modality K−, saying that there are on the left arbitrary
close points where the property holds. To be specific, K− is a one place modality; its truth table is
φ(x0, X1)
= ∀y ((y < x0) → ∃z(y < z < x0 ∧ z ∈ X1)) .
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Note that K− is not a future modality and K−(X) is equivalent to ¬(¬XSTrue). They look at the
fragment of TL(U,K−) which includes the formulas in which the modality K− occurs only inside the
scope of an occurrence of the modality U. This fragment is then shown to be expressively complete
for future formulas. Note however that this logic is not a temporal logic according to the definition
and in particular it does not have the property that any subformula of a formula is in itself a formula
in the logic.
4. It is a natural conjecture that the logic TL(U,K−) is expressively complete for a somewhat more
general class than that of future formulas:
Definition. A formula ϕ(t, X0, . . . , Xn) of the logic of order is called an almost future formula if
whenever ϕ holds at a point c of a model 〈A, <〉 then it also holds at c in every submodel 〈Ab, <〉,
provided b < c.
Conjecture. The temporal logic TL(U,K−) is expressively complete for almost future formulas of the
first-order monadic logic of order.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 4.3
The proof of the lemma, like Ehrenfeucht’s proof for ordinals, uses a characterization of logical
equivalence in terms of “Ehrenfeucht Fraisse games”. For simplicity of notations we define these games
only in the context of the models addressed to in lemma 4.3. A k-step game on chains
M = 〈A,<,C1, . . . , Cl〉 and M ′ = 〈A′, <,C′1, . . . , C′l〉 is played between two players Spoiler and
Duplicator and it involves k moves of each player; Spoiler plays first. He chooses one of the structures
and an element in that structure. Duplicator responds by choosing an element in the other model, which
he believes ‘matches’ the element chosen by Spoiler. This pair of moves is repeated for k rounds. Spoiler
may or may not alter the model he chooses the next element from and Duplicator always reacts by
choosing from the other model.
After k pairs of choices there are two sequences of elements: a1, . . . , ak in M and b1, . . . , bk in M ′.
Duplicator is deemed the winner if the two sequences include similar elements, i.e., if for all i, j  k.
1. ai < aj iff bi < bj .
2. Cm(ai) iff C′m(bi) for m = 1, . . . , l.
Otherwise Spoiler wins.
A winning strategy, for either player, is a strategy to follow, which will guarantee him or her a win,
no matter what moves the other player chooses to play.
The following theorem by Ehrenfeucht characterizes the equivalence ≡k in terms of these games [3]:
Theorem A.1. M ≡k M ′ iff Duplicator has a winning strategy for the k-step game.
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Ehrenfeucht proved that Duplicator has a winning strategy for the k-step game on 〈ωk,<〉 and
〈ωn,<〉, when k < n. We shall use his strategy to construct a winning strategy for Duplicator in the
k-step game on Mk and Mn. We recall the construction of the models under discussion: Mk = 〈R+, <,
Pk〉 is an isomorphic image of M ′k = 〈ωk × [0, 1),<,Qk〉 where Qk = ωk × {0}. We shall define the
winning strategy for duplicator as played for the models M ′k: Use Ehrenfeucht’s strategy on the first
coordinate and pick the exact element that your opponent chooses in the second coordinate. Specifically,
assume that sequences of points a1, . . . , ai and b1, . . . , bi were already played with aj = 〈αj , rj 〉 and
bj = 〈βj , rj 〉 for j = 1, . . . , i. It will be evident from the description of our strategy that indeed the
element in the second coordinate is the same in aj and bj , and that indeed α1, . . . , αi and β1, . . . , βi
represent a game confirming with Ehrenfeucht strategy for ordinals. On a move by Spoiler (without loss
of generality) ai+1 = 〈αi+1, ri+1〉 Duplicator makes the move 〈βi+1, ri+1〉 where βi+1 is the move that
Ehrenfeucht strategy suggests in the ordinal game α1, . . . , αi+1 and β1, . . . , βi .
It is now easy to see that if the game results in the sequences 〈α1, r1〉, . . . , 〈αk, rk〉 and 〈β1, r1〉, . . . ,
〈βk, rk〉 then these two sequences satisfy the requirements for winning in the definition above: Since
α1, . . . , αn, β1, . . . , βn is won by Duplicator in the ordinal game they are order isomorphic. By the
definition of the order in Mk and Mn the sequence in our game with similar numbers in the second
coordinate of corresponding points are also order isomorphic. Also because the second number in cor-
responding pairs is the same it is either 0 in both or it is 0 in none. By the definition of Qk and Qn we
have 〈αi, ri〉 ∈ Qk iff 〈βi, ri〉 ∈ Qn. This completes the proof that Duplicator has a winning strategy for
the k-game and hence that Mk ≡k Mn if k  n.
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